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I.

INTRODUCTION

Once upon a time in the 1950s, a new electronic medium graced the United
States-cable television. It raised a recurring question in U.S. media and
telecommunications policy: when a new medium impacts public service, other
telecommunications industries, public safety, and the like, how, if at all, should the
federal government regulate it? Although some issues are inherently local, most
electronic communications raise national concerns as to economic or technological
matters.l Unfortunately, neither Congress nor the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"),2 the government's chosen regulatory agent, has a particularly
outstanding track record in dealing with new media.
Both are faced with yet another impending issue, which has created more heat
than light in the last few years: the slow but ongoing development of FIOS and
Lightspeed (for convenience referred to as FIOS/Lightspeed in this piece) by Verizon
and AT&T, respectively, the two largest telecommunications companies in the
United States. 3 FIOS/Lightspeed seems locked into a regulatory regime very similar
to that of cable in its first three decades. The history of cable regulation provides
lessons for the regulation of successor technologies such as FIOS/Lightspeed.
Although the technological and economic infrastructure of FIOS/Lightspeed is
quite different from cable, this technology raises a number of the same regulatory
issues that were hashed out by the FCC, Congress, and the courts fifty years ago. It
thus may be useful to look at cable's federal regulatory history in order to shed some
light on prospective regulatory schemes for FIOS/Lightspeed. But first, it is
important to understand the technologies of cable and FIOS/Lightspeed, which are
quite different.
II. TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS OF CABLE AND FIOSjLlGHTSPEED

Although both cable and FIOS/Lightspeed have high bandwidth compared to
terrestrial broadcast television-i.e., more than 100 full-motion video color channels,
as well as interactive voice and data applications-their economic underpinnings are
somewhat different. Cable generally charges by the tier of channels (e.g., "basic,"
and "expanded basic"), while FIOS/Lightspeed uses per-program or per-use fees.
1.

For a delineation of issues with apparently inherent national characteristics, see discussion infra pp.
1044-45.

2.

The FCC, established by the Communications Act of 1934, is an independent federal agency that
regulates radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable communications. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). See
generally About the Federal Communication Commission, http://www.fcc.govlaboutus.html (last visited
Jan. 29, 2008).

3.

FIOS and Lightspeed are fiber optic services that represent the next generation of technology used to
provide television, Internet, and telephone services to customers at increasingly high speeds with greater
capacity. Each of these uses a slightly different version of fiber to the home ("FTTH") to deliver twoway, high-speed broadband services to homes and businesses. AT&T executives claim that Lightspeed
can be made fully compatible with FIOS. However, when pressed for an engineering explanation, their
responses are somewhat vague. The consumer service from AT&T often is termed "U-verse." AT&T
describes Lightspeed as the infrastructure and U-verse as the content. Confidential Interview with
AT&T executive, in N.Y., N.Y. (Oct. 16,2008). The distinction, however, is sometimes less than
clear.
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Further, their technological capabilities differ significantly, with varying abilities to
provide high-speed Internet and voice telephony. Nevertheless, both are multichannel video, voice, and data providers. Thus, to an as yet unknown extent, they
may compete directly with each other. They may also compete with direct broadcast
satellites ("DBS")-such as DirectTV and Echostar-that can deliver hundreds of
high-quality digital signals to terrestrial users from platforms 22,300 miles in space;
but which lack any interactive capability, thus making the provision of Internet or
voice telephony services impossible. 4
Both cable and fiber optics can deliver a hundred or more channels of programming
with varying degrees of interactive or two-way capacity, but they operate in radically
different ways. Cable uses essentially the same radio frequency transmission
technology as broadcast television, except that it distributes signals through coaxial
cable as well as through light-based fiber optic material, rather than over the air.
The basic plant is the same, whether the system distributes analog or digital signals,
or both. The main limitation on a cable system's bandwidth is not so much the cable
as the associated electronics, such as amplifiers and switchers. Precisely for this
reason cable operators are incorporating increasing amounts of fiber optics into their
systems.
A cable plant uses a "tree and branch" architecture in which signals move
"downstream" from a central "headend" to subscribers through a series of cables. It
thus resembles many traditional public utilities, such as water, gas, or electricity. 5
Although some cable systems are adding small switches, unlike traditional telephone
companies they cannot connect subscribers directly with third parties for two-way or
interactive services. 6 To the extent that cable operators provide telephony or Internet
services, they generally do so through direct cable modem connections to Internet
service providers ("ISPs"), rather than through their own systems. Therefore, cable
systems are not interactive in the same sense as local or long distance telephone
carriers.
FIOS/Lightspeed uses fiber optics for virtually all wiring, other than the "last
mile" to a home or business? Though both Verizon and AT&T are extraordinarily
secretive about their technology, some information about their architecture is known.

4.

But cf Press Release, Hicks Holdings, LLC, Hicks Holdings Forms New Venture, DIRECTPATH, to
Provide DirectTV, Broadband, Other Services to Multiple Dwelling Unit Market (May 2,2006), http://
phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=127160&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=851360&highlight
(announcing that its new company "will help drive the efficient deployment of the full suite of DirectTV
content plus such advanced service offerings as HDTV, digital video recording (DVR), [and] interactive
services"). Despite asserting that it has a solution to provide two-way capacity, so far DirectTV has not
adopted any detailed plan.

S.

MICHAEL BOTEIN, REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA: LAW AND POLICY FOR RADIO,
TELEVISION, CABLE AND THE NEW VIDEO TECHNOLOGIES 6 (3d ed. 1998).

6.

Id.

7.

See Robert Crandall, J. Gregory Sidak & Hal Singer, Does Video Delivered over a Telephone Network
Require a Cable Franchise, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 251, 253-55 (2007).

1043

FEDERAL REGULATION OF FIOS AND LlGHTSPEED

FIOS runs fiber optics directly to the user while Lightspeed uses copper wire. 8 Thus,
FIOS somewhat resembles cable's tree and branch architecture; downstream signals
are ubiquitous to all subscribers within the same service tier. The similarity is
relatively minor, however, because FIOS is a fully interactive system, unlike most
cable systems. Lightspeed, on the other hand, seems to provide one signal at a time
through a "video on demand" basis, presumably making it, unlike FIOS, an Internet
Protocol-driven system. 9 This distinction, however, does not prevent FIOS
subscribers from using the system to access the Internet to send and receive video,
voice, or data.
FIOS and Lightspeed thus are significantly different not only from cable, but
also from each other, if only because of Lightspeed's use of Internet Protocol to
provide switching and addressing functions. lO Neither service is technologically
compatible with cable, and it is doubtful whether they could be compatible with each
other. Lightspeed officials claim that on a very basic transmission level the two
systems theoretically could interconnect because both are digita1. 11 As is so common
in this area, however, there is no publicly available engineering data to support this
proposition because of the intense secrecy surrounding these technologies. Thus, the
legal regime may be dealing with three technologically distinct and incompatible
multi-channel approaches: cable, FIOS, and Lightspeed-and potentially a fourth
approach, DBS.
DBS poses fewer jurisdictional issues than FIOS/Lightspeed since its use of
over-the-air frequencies clearly brings it within the definition of broadcastingP If
DBS develops the capacity to interconnect users, it obviously would be more akin to
other multi-channel providers in regulatory terms.
III. FEDERAL CABLE REGULATION

A. Rationales for Federal, State, and Local Regulation
All media are not created equal, and some require no federal presence. For
example, there naturally is an interest in ensuring that newspapers do not litter or
employ drunk drivers when delivering their wares. But this certainly falls within the
traditional public safety functions of local governments. The idea of federally
licensing delivery trucks and drivers presumably would be objectionable to most
observers.
Terrestrial broadcast stations also are subject to local governmental jurisdiction
in a number of respects: for example, requiring permission to use public property or
adhering to zoning requirements. They also require some type of federal coordination
8.

Id.

9.

See AT&T U-Verse, Internet Protocol (IP) Video Distribution Advantages, http://www.att.com/
Uverse/files/IPVideoDistribution_2-22.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).

10.

See id.

11.

Confidential Interview with AT&T executive, in N.Y., N.Y. (Apr. 5, 2008).

12.

See Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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since their frequencies cross local and often state boundaries, thus potentially causing
interference that only a national entity can preventP Even Professor Coase's classic
marketplace regulation theorem recognizes that some national body must allocate
frequencies in order to prevent electrical interference. 14
With cable-and potentially FIOS/Lightspeed-the jurisdictional situation is
not so clear. Many aspects of their operations are solely within the local jurisdiction
of cities, particularly those involving the use of public property for road or curb cuts
to lay cable. At the same time, some of their operations raise substantial federal
issues even beyond the electrical interference potentially caused by terrestrial
broadcasters. These involve both technological and economic considerations, very
often combined with a healthy dose of competition policy. A few examples include:
(i) public safety considerations, such as emergency communications;15 (ii) interesting
and informative programming for a national audience; (iii) intermodal competition
and its effect upon consumers, such as potential cable-FIOS/Lightspeed on a national
basis;16 (iv) policies to ensure that FIOS/Lightspeed carries local terrestrial broadcast
signals in order to allow, or at least prolong, its economic viability; (v) requirements
that media do not prevent other operators from buying attractive programming;1?
and (vi) equal treatment of content providers by the Internet, in terms of bandwidth,
delivery, etc.-so-called "network neutrality."18
At least some characteristics of cable seem to require national and hence federal
regulation. This is not to suggest that, historically, the only appropriate authority to
deal with federal interests in cable has been the FCC. Congress obviously could
have created a completely new agency or given cable jurisdiction to an existing body,
such as the Federal Trade Commission. Indeed, Congress initially gave power over
13.

See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-88 (1969) ("When two people converse face to face,
both should not speak at once if either is to be clearly understood .... But the ... problem ofinterference
is a massive reality.").

14.

Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L.

15.

The FCC recently went through a complicated and complex process in setting aside frequencies for
public safety providers (e.g., police, fire, and medical) in newly free portions of the 700 Mhz band. In
the Matter of Service Rules for 698-746, 747-762, and 777-792 MHz Bands, Third Further Notice of
Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 14301 (explaining the process toward "achieving the goal of a nationwide
interoperable broadband wireless network for public safety entities"); see also Fed. Commc'n Comm'n,
Revised 700 MHz Plan for Commercial Services, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/
bandplansI700MHzBandPlan.pdf.

16.

FIOS/Lightspeed also competes with a host of other print and electronic media. For example, it
presumably takes away some number of magazine or newspaper readers-in a time of declining print
media revenues-as well as audiences for terrestrial television, DBS, and cable. See generally Crandall,
Sidak & Singer, supra note 7, at 261-62 (discussing multi-channel competitors).

1 7.

This prohibition, preventing other operators from purchaSing attractive programming, already applies
to cable. 47 U.S.C. § 548(b) (2006).

18.

See Robert Hahn & Scott Wallsten, The Economics of Network Neutrality, THE ECONOMISTS' VOICE,
Apr. 2006, at 1, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vo13/iss6/art8/; Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband
Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003) (explaining the conflict surrounding
network neutrality as it applies to the "open access" debate).
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interstate telephone companies to the now-terminated Interstate Commerce
Commission, even though its only experience was with railroad carriers. This had
the obvious drawback of creating different agencies with power over similar media,
which would have been increasingly aggravated with the later emergence of new
related or competitive technologies.
B. Overview

of Cable Regulation: "Reasonably Ancillary" Jurisdiction

The FCC initially was slow to intervene in cable regulation. By the late 1950s,
broadcasters were sufficiently concerned about the potential development of cableeven though it had less than one million subscribers, which FIOS and Lightspeed
each now claim to have-and requested that the FCC regulate it. The FCC reaction
was negative; in a 1959 case and rulemaking, the FCC concluded that cable did not
represent a significant threat to "free" terrestrial broadcasting. In a decision that
would come back to haunt it, the FCC held that it might not have jurisdiction over
cable, since cable was neither a common carrier nor a broadcaster.19 At that time, the
Communications Act only covered carriers and broadcasters, thus leaving no
independent jurisdictional basis for cable. 20
The FCC's reaction to the new technology was not unusual. When confronted
with a new and unknown medium, its first strategy has often been just to ignore
it-as it subsequently has done with the Internet and FIOS/Lightspeed. In some
respects, its behavior resembles the Kubler-Ross model of dealing with grief, which
begins with denial and ends in acceptance. 21
By the beginning of the 1960s, the FCC was left with a medium which called for
federal, state, and local regulation of its components-what became generally known
as concurrent jurisdiction. This was not a new situation for the agency; it had been
dealing with state public service commissions for years in separately regulating
interstate and intrastate aspects of telephone companies. In situations involving both,
the FCC and state authorities have convened "joint boards" under the Communications
Act.
During the next few years, the FCC slowly began to regulate cable. The FCC
limited a cable operator in carrying "distant" television signals from other areas by
prohibiting a microwave common carrier from delivering the signals; it based its
jurisdiction not on the cable system's status, but on its licensing authority over the

19.

Frontier Broad. Co., 24 F.C.C. 2d 251 (1958), reconsideration denied, 26 F.C.C. 2d 403 (1959). In holding
that CATV systems are not under the jurisdiction of the Communications Act, the FCC implicitly held
that CATV broadcasters were not responsible for the "economic plight" of local television stations. Id.
at 253-56.

20.

See Cable Act of 1984,98 Stat. 2779 (1992) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 609 (2006)) (beginning the
creation of a comprehensive statutory framework for cable).

21.

ELISABETH KUBLER-Ross & DAVID KESSLER, ON GRIEF AND GRIEVING: FINDING THE MEANING OF
GRIEF THROUGH THE FIVE STAGES OF Loss 7 (Simon & Schuster 2005). The stages are: denial, anger,
bargaining, depression, and acceptance. Id. Some aspects of all five stages may be present in regulatory
agencies' treatment of new challenges.
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common carrier.22 Technically, the FCC was regulating the microwave carrier, rather
than the cable operator. However, its rationale was potentially economically harmful
for cable operators. As the FCC recognized, this was an indirect form of regulation.
It later imposed a comprehensive set of signal regulations on all cable systems
receiving signals via microwave. 23
This left the FCC's glass only half full, however, since at that time only large
cable systems used microwave carriers. As a result, it had jurisdiction over only part
of the industry. In 1966 it nevertheless adopted a comprehensive set of rules applicable
to all systems, setting the stage for ten years worth of litigation and three trips to the
Supreme Court regarding its jurisdiction over cable. 24
In 1968 the Court held that cable might be neither common carriage nor
broadcasting, but that the FCC had jurisdiction over it for actions "reasonably
ancillary to its authority over broadcasting."25 United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.
involved a California cable system's attempt to "import" an out-of-market broadcast
television signal. The FCC had adopted a highly difficult set of full-blown
evidentiary hearings at which a cable operator had to prove that a signal's importation
would not harm local television stations. The petitioner, Southwestern, sought to
avoid the hearing requirement. The Court accepted that cable was not subject to any
express provision of the Communications Act but recognized that the FCC's
authority under section 152(a) of the Act did not preclude it from issuing "such rules
and regulations ... not inconsistent with law."26 This seems like purely housekeeping
language to implement the substantive provisions as to carriers, broadcasters, and
other electronic media. In highly ambiguous terms, the Court held:
It is enough to emphasize that the authority which we recognize today under
Section 152(a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of
television broadcasting. . .. We express no views as to the Commission's
authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any other circumstances or for any
other purposesY

The circumstances suggest that the Court did not intend to create plenary FCC
jurisdiction over cable. Instead, it may only have been looking for a simple way out
22.

See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 E2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
951 (1963).

23. Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 EC.C. 683 (Apr. 22, 1965) (First Report and Order).
24.

CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (Mar. 4, 1966) (Second Report and Order).

25. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). The point at issue was whether under the 1966
Second Report and Order cable systems were required to obtain prior FCC approval-after an
evidentiary hearing-to bring in a "distant" broadcast signal from another television service market. Id.
at 159 n.l.
26. Id. at 178 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 303(r)); see also 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006) (defining the FCC's duties and
power to include "mak[ing] such rules and regulations ... not inconsistent with [the Communications
Act], as may be necessary in the execution of its functions").
27.

Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 178.
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of the Communications Act's inadequacies and Congress's failure to act for over a
decade. Indeed, the Court very well may have seen Southwestern as a one-off case,
and thought that it would not need to deal with the issue again-which soon proved
to be an incorrect assumption. In any event, the operative language, as well as the
issue involved, seems to suggest that the Court viewed this case as a turf battle
between broadcasters and cable operators, with few other ramifications.
Within four years, the ancillary jurisdiction issue was back before the Court,
forcing it to deal with Southwestern's ambiguous "other circumstances" and "other
purposes" language. In United States v. Midwest Video Corp. ("Midwest F'), a cable
operator challenged the FCC's "program-origination" rule that required cable systems
to operate, "to a significant extent," as a local outlet through programming a channel
with local news and public affairs. 28 The FCC had adopted rules requiring large
cable systems to provide a channel of "public service" type programming to their
local communities. 29 Unlike later rules, this rule gave cable operators complete
content control. In a plurality decision, the Court ultimately upheld the rule under
Southwestern's reasonably ancillary analysis;30 Chief Justice Burger concurred in the
result and noted that the rule "strain[ed] the outer limits" of the agency's authority. 31
The Court heard what might have been the last reasonably ancillary case in 1979
in FCC v. Midwest Video Corporation ("Midwest II"), a rematch between the Midwest
I parties. 32 In this case, the operator challenged the FCC's replacement of the
program-origination rule with "access" requirements for public, education, and
governmental ("PEG") and leased channels. 33
Whether Midwest II actually involved the reasonably ancillary doctrine is less
than clear. Although a majority invalidated the access requirements, the Court
seemed to acknowledge the existence of jurisdiction but held that such jurisdiction
could not apply to the access channel rules. The majority claimed that the
requirements essentially turned cable operators into common carriers by requiring
them to carry third parties' material without any content control. 34
This may have been somewhat questionable for several reasons. First, section
153(10) of the Communications Act provides that "a person engaged in ... broadcasting
shall not ... be deemed a common carrier."35 Twenty years before, Carter Mountain
Transmission Corp. v. FCC established that cable operators were not broadcasters, and

28. 406 U.S. 649, 657 (1972).
29.

!d. at 653-55.

30. Id. at 669-70.
31.

Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring).

32. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
33. In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that the author represented the intervener, the
American Civil Liberties Union, in these proceedings.
34. Midwest II, 440 U.S. at 701.

35. 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2006) (emphasis added).
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thus they could not be subject to the same protections as broadcasters.36 Second, the
access channel rules required operators to make only a limited amount of bandwidth
available, and only to entities with public service agendas-schools, local governments,
clubs, churches, and the like. This regulatory regime was significantly different
from traditional common carrier regulation, which required an operator to make all
of its capacity available to anyone able to pay the established rate. Finally, since the
Court emphasized that cable systems were neither broadcasters nor common carriers,
the decision may have been based more on an ultra vires theory than on either
traditional common carrier regulation or reasonably ancillary jurisdiction.
Even in the short run, the actual rationale may have been less than important. In
the 1984 Cable Act, Congress mooted the whole debate by giving power over access
channel requirements to state and local governments, thus making section 153(10) of
the Communications Act, relating to the federal requirements, totally irrelevant. 37
Because FIOS/Lightspeed includes a broad-based constituency, a legislative resolution
very well may be far more preferable than a joint agency-court result that would
occur under cases like Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Deftnse Council. 38
Though Congress has resolved the issues involved in these cable regulation cases,
a question remains as to whether the reasonably ancillary doctrine still has any
juridical existence, and, if so, whether it might apply to other media. Surprisingly
enough, there still may be some life in the old rationale. In a relatively recent
decision, the Supreme Court was faced with deciding whether cable modems provided
"telecommunications services," thus making them subject to common carrier types of
obligations. 39 In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Services, the Court upheld the FCC's declaratory ruling that cable modems-through
ISPs-offered "information" rather than "telecommunications" services. 40 This
effectively immunized them from regulation as common carriers.
The opinion is somewhat opaque, with a running debate between Justice Thomas
in the majority and Justice Scalia in dissent framing arguments based on examples of
how to characterize the functions of pizza deliveries and dog leashes. One of the
majority's arguments is that the FCC may impose some carrier-type obligations on
non-telecommunications services 41-almost precisely the position rejected by the

36. See Carter Mountain, 321 F.2d 359.

37.

47 U.S.C. § 556 (2006) (relating to coordination of federal, state, and local authority).

38. See 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). Perhaps the most influential case in modern U.S. administrative law,
Chevron holds, in relevant part, that judicial review of administrative action is a two-step process: (1)
whether Congress's intent is clear in the relevant enabling statute, and (2) if not, whether the agency's
interpretation of the statute is reasonable. !d. at 842-44.
39. Nat'! Cable & Te!ecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
40. !d. at 977-78. The Court held that Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in refusing to apply Chevron,
id. at 984, and went further to note that the FCC's construction passed both steps in the Chevron twostep analysis, id. at 997.
41. !d. at 996-97.
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Court in Midwest II in 1979. 42 Indeed, at one point Justice Thomas, in dicta, notes
that "the Commission remains free to impose special regulatory duties on facilitiesbased ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction."43
Whether Title I ancillary jurisdiction is still viable has yet to be seen. But fifty
years of experience with it through cable regulation may provide some useful lessons
for FIOS/Lightspeed regulation.
IV. LESSONS FOR FIOS/LiGHTSPEED

At present, it is less than clear how many customers subscribe to either FIOS or
Lightspeed. Each predicted subscription rates exceeding a million as of the end of
2008. 44 But some observers saw a much larger difference and predicted more than a
million FIOS subscribers in 2008 and a few hundred thousand for Lightspeed. 45
Moreover, the capital expenditures appear to be extremely high-somewhere in the
range of $4000 per subscriber-making it less than clear whether these systems will
ever be profitable. 46
Regardless of accuracy, this range is very close to the number of cable subscribers
in 1959, when broadcasters first asked the FCC to regulate cable television. 47 This
raises the question as to whether, at this point, there is any need for federal regulation
of FIOS/Lightspeed. Since the FCC took ten years to establish its jurisdiction over
cable in Southwestern,48 and Congress another fifteen to pass the first cable
legislation,49 a need to rush to federal intervention may be less than clear. In any
event, at this point, there is no clear basis for federal jurisdiction.
As with the history of cable regulation, the first question under Chevron is
whether there is any clear congressional mandate in the area. 50 When FIOSI
Lightspeed first debuted in the middle of the decade, a number of observers42.

Midwest 11,440 U.S. at 709.

43.

Brand X, 545 U.S. at 996 (emphasis added).

44.

See Todd Spangler, Charge of the Light Brigade, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, July 21,2008, at 12 [hereinafter
Spangler, Charge of the Light Brigade}; Todd Spangler, U-Verse TV: Half Million Served, MULTICHANNEL

NEWS, July 28,2008, at 10.
45.

See Joe Savage, Managing Director, Telecom ThinkTank Inc., Presentation at the GLGi Seminar:
Lightspeed vs. FiOS 15 (Sept. 13,2007), available at http://www.glgroup.com/Council-Events/GLGi-Lightspeed-vs.-FiOS-2552118.html (follow "Supporting Materials Download PowerPoint" hyperlink).
Actual 2008 data is not yet available.

46. Saul Hansell, A Smart Bet or a Big Mistake?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,2008, at C1; Spangler, Charge of the
Light Brigade, supra note 44; see also Michael Botein, The Demise of the Information Superhighway, 2
MEDIA L. & POLY 85, 88 (2003) (providing data on DSL costs, which are comparable to FIOS).
47.

Thomas R. Eisenmann, Cable TV: From Community Antennas to Wired Cities, HARV. Bus. SCH. WORKING
KNOWLEDGE, July 10, 2000, http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/1591.html (putting the number of cable
subscribers at 150,000 in 1955).

48.

Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.

49.

Cable Communications Act of 1984, § 601, 98 Stat. 730 (1984) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 532
(2006)); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.

50.

See supra note 38.
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particularly potential competitors-rushed to conclude that FIOS/Lightspeed was
another form of cable. The argument was that the new services were just an
alternative delivery mechanism for multi-channel programming, and thus could and
should be regulated under the cable provisions in Title VI of the Communications
Act. 51
But this interpretation goes against the clear language of section 522(7) of the
Communications Act, which defines "cable system" as a facility providing "cable
service" and includes "video programming to multiple subscribers within a
community."52 On its face, this encompasses at least some FIOS/Lightspeed
functions since they do provide video programming to local subscribers. It does not
give any weight, however, to the statute's use of the phrase "cable service," which is a
defined term. Under section 522(6), cable service means: "(A) the one-way
transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii) other programming
service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or
use of such video programming or other programming service."53 FIOS/Lightspeed
service clearly includes one-way video programming and two-way interactive
programming. 54 But it also offers a host of other two-way services, such as voice or
video telephony, high-speed Internet access, and enhanced control of video reception.
It thus seems to go far beyond the contemplation of the 1996 amendments to the
Communications Act. 55 But this is less than surprising since, in 1996, the most
advanced cable systems offered a large number of downstream channels and limited
interaction for video-on-demand. Thus, there was no reason for the drafters to
anticipate the advent of technologies like FIOS/Lightspeed.
After this brief initial enthusiasm for treating FIOS/Lightspeed as cable, it
became clear that some other jurisdictional basis for its regulation would be necessary.
Indeed, a number of bills quickly surfaced in Congress to give the FCC jurisdiction
over FIOS/Lightspeed including a national franchising bill for both cable and FIOSI
Lightspeed, which the House passed in 2006. 56
There is, however, another obvious possible approach based on fifty years of
cable regulatory history: reasonably ancillary jurisdiction. For reasons which still are
somewhat unclear, there was no attempt to invoke this, even after Brand X seemed to

51.

47 U.S.C. § 609 (2006); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.

52. 47 U.S.C. § 522(7) (2006).
53. 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (2006) (emphasis added).
54.

See Crandall, Sidak & Singer, supra note 7, at 279-81 (explaining how Lightspeed utilizes both one-way
cable transmission and two-way interactive cable capabilities).

55.

[d. at 280; see also 47 U.S.C. § 571 (2006).

56.

See Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of2006, H.R. 5252, 109th Congo

§ 630 (2006) (as referred to Senate). This bill did not move out of the Senate and, in fact, the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation amended the bill and removed all language
relating to national franchises. See Advanced Telecommunications and Opportunities Reform Act,
H.R. 5252, 109th Congo (2006).
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acknowledge its continued existence in 2005. 57 Whether it would have been viable,
however, is less than clear.
As will be remembered, the basic reasoning behind the Southwestern Court's
invocation of reasonably ancillary jurisdiction was to prevent cable from adversely
impacting "free" terrestrial broadcast television by attracting viewers and hence
advertising dollars. 58 The conventional wisdom was that this would deprive many
viewers of any television service since they would not be able to afford cable
subscriptions-which then were about six dollars per month. The validity of this
rationale seems somewhat questionable in hindsight since, in 2008, basic cable
subscribership exceeded 64 million 59 and DBS subscribership exceeded 17 million,60
thus leaving terrestrial broadcasting as a very minor player. Moreover, today's law
and economics approach, as derived from the Coase theorem, presumably would
frown upon government suppression of competition to preserve public service. 61 The
FCC may have been right in predicting cable's popularity-referring to its "explosive
growth" as early as 1966-but it was wrong in foreseeing how many viewers would
be willing to pay for it.
The Southwestern Court was quite clear, however, that reasonably ancillary
jurisdiction was a protectionist measure, pure and simple. It "emphasize[d]" that the
FCC's jurisdiction covered only the "effective performance of the Commission's
responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting."62 And as indicated by the
1970s Midwest Video cases, the Court had little sympathy for the FCC's later efforts
to achieve social policy goals unrelated to broadcast protectionism, such as programorigination and access channels. 63
Under a close reading, reasonably ancillary jurisdiction seems to apply only to the
protection of the terrestrial broadcasting industry-with the possible exception of

57.

See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975-76.

58.

Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 174-78.

59.

National Cable & Telecommunications Association Statistics, http://www.ncta.com/Statistic/Statistic/
Statistics.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). As of June 2008, with 64.7 million subscribers, cable was
present in 57.1% of households. !d.

60. Press Release, DIRECTV Group, Inc., The DIRECTV Group Announces Second Qyarter 2008
Results (Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://dtv.client.shareholder.com/releasedetaiL cfm? ReleaseID =32 6924
(placing subscribership at 17.2 million, a 6% increase from 2007); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-05-257, TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/highlights/
d05257high.pdf(providing overall data on DBS growth rate). InJanuary 2004, total DBS subscribership
was 21.4 million, making DBS present in 17.4% of households. !d. at 6.
61.

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

62.

Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added).

63.

Midwest II, 440 U.S. at 701 (invalidating access requirements for PEG and leased channels); Midwest J,
406 U.S. at 676 (Burger, C.]., concurring) (noting that the FCC's program-origination rule "strains the
outer limits of even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction" granted to the Commission); see also
discussion supra p. 1048.
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the one-liner throw-away in Brand X. 64 But this is largely a moot subject today since
Congress has not only codified the signal carriage rules at issue in Southwestern, but
has also authorized cable carriage of both local and distant broadcast signals. 65
These provisions naturally do not apply to FIOS/Lightspeed since they are not
"cable systems."66 But there is a more important question: What would regulation of
FIOS/Lightspeed be reasonably ancillary to? Even the broadcasting industry does
not claim that FIOS/Lightspeed would have any adverse impact on it. And it is hard
to imagine any competitive injury, since FIOS and particularly Lightspeed mainly
sell premium programming, telephony, and Internet services-rather than advertisersupported programming.
Ironically enough, the medium potentially most affected by FIOS/Lightspeed is
cable. Both historically and legally, however, it seems a bit bizarre to invoke
reasonably ancillary jurisdiction to protect the industry which the doctrine was
originally created to limit. In terms of both precedent and practicality, it is unlikely
that the reasonably ancillary doctrine is a viable jurisdictional basis for regulating
FIOS/Lightspeed.
This seems to put any federal presence in this area on a typical Chevron basis. 67
Until Congress legislates to establish some form of federal jurisdiction, the FCC
seems unlikely to have any rationale for taking any action-which may suit its
preference for denial.
This does not, however, leave FIOS/Lightspeed free from all regulation. Just as
with the proto-history of cable, state and local governments have been quick to step
in for several reasons. First, they clearly have authority to regulate the use of public
property, which naturally includes streets and other rights of way. At the same time
that the Supreme Court was creating reasonably ancillary jurisdiction for the FCC,
it upheld, in a memorandum decision, the power of states and cities to regulate the
local activities of cable systems. 68 This gave local governments a measure ofland use
64. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 996 ("[TJhe Commission remains free to impose special regulatory duties on

facilities-based ISPs under Title I ancillary jurisdiction.").
65.

See 47 U.S.C. § 534 (2006).

66.

See discussion supra p. 105l.

67.

See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.

68. TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 396 U.S. 556 (1970) (per curiam). The Court later held that the Cable Act
authorized the FCC to prevent state or local governments from imposing upon cable operators any
technical requirements more stringent than the FCC's. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988).
In addition, section 253 of the Communications Act states rather vaguely that the FCC may preempt
any state or local law which would preempt the offering of a telecommunications service:
(a) In general. No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to
provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service .... Cd) If, after notice and
an opportunity for public comment, the Commission determines that a State or local
government has permitted or imposed any statute, regulation, or legal requirement that
violates subsection Ca) ... the Commission shall preempt the enforcement of such statute,
regulation, or legal requirement to the extent necessary to correct such violation or
inconsistency.
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control over towers, pedestals, and the like. More important, however, it gave them
the authority to require the establishment of local franchises. This in turn became a
convenient basis for local governments to charge cable operators a fee for using public
property-first the FCC69 and later Congress70 capped this fee at five percent of
annual gross receipts. This cap was essentially the result of a negotiated compromise
between the National Cable Telecommunications Association and the National
League of Cities.71
After almost forty years of a healthy revenue flow from cable franchise fees, state
and local governments naturally are not inclined to forego similar fees from FIOS or
Lightspeed. And there is no reason to; these media need public rights-of-ways as
much as cable in order to lay their wires. From the moment of their emergence,
FIOS and Lightspeed were met with state and local demands for franchisesincluding, of course, at least five percent franchise fees.
The problem for the new media was not so much the payments-which were
anticipated-as the delay in negotiating literally thousands of separate franchise
agreements. This obviously would have been a major impediment to a quick rollout
of the new technology. The solution to this logjam, in many cases, was ultimately
either the creation of state-wide franchises for both cable operators and FIOSI
Lightspeed or state requirements that local governments impose the same franchise
terms on both industries-including franchise fees, access channels, and the like. At
present, more than half a dozen states have adopted one of these approaches. 72

v.

CONCLUSION

FIOS/Lightspeed seems to be locked into a regulatory regime very similar to the
first three decades of cable regulation. As with cable regulation, Congress does not
appear to be in a hurry to act. After all, while FIOS/Lightspeed may be the newest
entry in the media and telecommunications field, it has comparatively little
importance in terms of broad national concerns ranging from war to economics.
However, Congress may soon be forced to act. While the reasonably ancillary
doctrine created a limited presence for the federal government during cable's
interregnum, it does not seem applicable to FIOS/Lightspeed in any respect.
Due in large part to the lack of federal intervention, states and local governments
have been free to make their own rules-just as they did with cable from the 1950s
to the 1980s. As with the cable industry fifty years ago, this naturally may be a bit
dysfunctional by creating different standards from one locale to another. However,
47 U.S.C. § 253 (2006). However, the Supreme Court largely ignored the statute in its only invocation
to date. See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
69. 47 C.ER. § 76.31 (1984) (repealed by 50 Fed. Reg. 18637 (1985)).
70. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (2006).
71. Michael Botein & Fredrik Cederqvist, The 1992 Cable Television Act, in 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 411, 419 (Fritz E. Froehlich & Allen Kent eds., 1997).

72. Crandall, Sidak & Singer, supra note 7, at 256 n.2l. States that have passed legislation include Virginia,
Texas, California, Indiana, Kansas, New Jersey, North Carolina, and South Carolina. !d.
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it may not be unfair to observe that cable survived this regulatory diaspora in good
financial health, as should FIOS/Lightspeed-if their underlying technological and
economic assumptions are correct.
Moreover, it may be preferable to leave the federal issues in the hands of Congress.
On a very general level, there may be some democratic value in taking time to build
a consensus among competing industry groups, government, and the public. Perhaps
more important, these technologies are still new and untested. Little is actually
known about how they will function in long-term deployments-virtually no hard
data exists as to the real capital expenditures, penetration rates, content, and
maintenance. Government intervention in this field has a less than impressive
record, as seen by the corpses of regulatory regimes littering the history of cable.
Thus, it may not be necessary for this new technology to be regulated. If and when
Congress, state and local governments, and administrative agencies move forward in
attempting to regulate this technology, however, they would do well to heed the
three decades worth of lessons that can be learned from the process of cable
regulation.
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